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Abstract
We present a Bayesian analysis of the epistemology of analogue
experiments with particular reference to Hawking radiation. Pro-
vided such experiments can be ‘externally validated’ via univer-
sality arguments, we prove that they are confirmatory in Bayesian
terms. We then provide a formal model for the scaling behaviour
of the confirmation measure for multiple distinct realisations of
the analogue system and isolate a generic saturation feature. Fi-
nally, we demonstrate that different potential analogue realisations
could provide different levels of confirmation. Our results thus
provide a basis both to formalise the epistemic value of analogue
experiments that have been conducted and to advise scientists as
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1 Introduction
In a landmark paper, (Steinhauer 2016) reported the experimental ob-
servation of Hawking radiation in an acoustic analogue black hole (or
‘dumb hole’). This remarkable result has met with a strangely diver-
gent response in the physics community, varying from the assertion
that it provides ‘experimental confirmation of Hawking’s prediction’
(Jeff Steinhauer quoted in Haaterz), to dismissal simply as ‘an amus-
ing feat of engineering’ that ‘won’t teach us anything about black holes’
(Daniel Harlow quoted in Quanta). What can we learn from such ana-
logue black hole experiments? Are there circumstances in which they be
taken to provide inductive support for conclusions about astrophysical
black holes?
In this paper we will extend previous philosophical work character-
ising analogue black hole experiments as a form of ‘analogue simula-
tion’ (Dardashti et al. 2017; The´bault 2016) via application of Bayesian
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confirmation theory. In that previous analysis, emphasis was placed
upon the qualitative claim that universality arguments can be used to link
evidence about the ‘source’ dumb hole system to the ‘target’ black hole
system. Here, we present a theorem that demonstrates how this claim
can be qualitatively characterised in Bayesian terms. A more nuanced
quantitive question in this context is how many different analogue sys-
tems one needs to construct to be confident in the astrophysical effect.
With this in mind, a further focus in this paper will be upon the scaling
behaviour of Bayesian confirmation measures in the context of multiple
distinct experimental realisations of the analogue system. The second
key result of this paper is a formal model for ‘multiple source’ analogue
simulation displaying the generic feature of ‘saturation’ in confirmatory
power with an increase in the number of sources.
Finally, and perhaps most intriguingly, there is the question of
whether different potential analogue realisations could provide differ-
ent levels of confirmation. This is established in third key result of the
paper, a theorem proving that analogue experiments in which we are
more confident about the fundamental physics teach us less about the
target system than those about which we are less confident. Our results
thus provide a basis to both formalise the epistemic value of analogue
experiments that have been conducted, like that of Steinhauer, and to
advise scientists as to the respective epistemic value of future analogue
experiments.
2 Confirmation, Analogy and Experiment
The literature on analogical reasoning in science is fairly extensive, with
particularly noteworthy contributions by Keynes (1921), Hesse (1963,
1964, 1974), Bailer-Jones (2009) and Bartha (2010, 2013).1 Typically ana-
logical arguments have the form of abstract speculative inferences re-
garding possible features of one system (‘the target’) based on known
features of another system (‘the source’). Classic examples are Reid’s
1See also Norton (2011) for an importantly different take on analogical arguments.
Norton’s analysis focuses on analogical arguments that proceed via subsumption of
the target system into a larger class of entities, including the source system. There are
some parallels between the structure of such inferences and our claim that (defended
below) that analogue experiments can be confirmatory given they are externally vali-
dated by universality arguments.
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argument for the existence of life on other planets based upon life on
earth (Reid and Hamilton 1850) or Hume’s argument for animal con-
sciousness based upon human consciousness (Hume 1978).
Analogical arguments evidently play an important heuristic role in
scientific practice in that they provide ‘cognitive strategies for creative
discovery’ (Bailer-Jones 2009, p. 56). The epistemic role of analogical ar-
guments in science is, however, more controversial. In particular, the
literature contains diverging answers regarding whether analogical ar-
guments can provide Bayesian confirmation of a hypothesis regarding
the target system. From a Bayesian perspective on confirmation, evi-
dence for a hypothesis can count as confirmatory only if the probability
of the hypothesis given the evidence together with certain background
assumptions is larger than the probability of the hypothesis given only
the background assumptions. In a detailed and nuanced treatment of
the issue, Hesse (1974, pp. 208-19) suggests that analogical arguments
can in some cases be confirmatory in a Bayesian sense, so long as the ana-
logical relationship that holds is in terms of what she calls a ‘material
analogy’. That is, where there is a similarity relations of sharing at least
one predicate between the target and source systems.2
Contrastingly, Bartha (2010, 2013) offers a persuasive argument that
analogical arguments cannot in principle be confirmatory in a Bayesian
sense. This is because the information encapsulated in an analogical ar-
gument is taken to already be part of the ‘background knowledge’, and
thus the probability of a hypothesis regarding the target system to be
identical before and after including the information encapsulated in an
analogical argument. Rather one assumes that arguments by analogy
to establish only the plausibility of a conclusion, and with it grounds
for further investigation (Salmon 1990; Bartha 2010). On this analysis, it
is not in principle possible for analogical arguments to confer inductive
support for a hypothesis. That is, although analogical arguments can
certainly be stronger or weaker, even the strongest possible analogical
argument cannot confer confirmation in a Bayesian sense: they are ab-
stract inferences that can only ever support plausibility claims rather
than providing inductive evidence.
2Hesse (1974, p. 216) explicitly rules out the possibility of confirmation obtaining
in cases where there is purely a ‘formal analogy’. That is, where target and source are
both interpretations of the same formal calculus but do not share material similarities.
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Although worthy and insightful, the treatments of Hesse (1974) and
Bartha (2010) are both largely irrelevant for the analysis of analogue ex-
periments. This is because, in the first case, Hesse’s notion of material
analogy is too strict to accommodate the purely syntactic relation that
the model of the target has to the model of source in the case of ana-
logue experiments, such as the Steinhauer experiments. We are dealing
with an analogue simulation that does not involve a material analogy in
the sense of Hesse. Rather than a material relation between systems,
we have a syntactic relation between models.3 Bartha’s negative anal-
ysis of the prospect for confirmation via analogical argument is simi-
larly inapplicable to analogue experiments. In this case because of the
‘experimental’ rather than the ‘simulation’ side of things. Analogue ex-
periments unlike analogical arguments are essentially empirical: they
involve learning about the world by manipulating it. In experiments
such as those carried out by Steinhauer, we manipulate the source such
that certain explicit modelling assumptions matching those for the tar-
get obtain. Analogue simulation thus resembles a form of experimenta-
tion, involving the ‘programming’ of a physical system such that it can
be used to ‘simulate’ another physical system. Thus, we see that con-
clusions from the philosophical analysis of analogical argument should
not be taken to be readily extendible to cases of analogue simulation in
contemporary science. In particular, it is self-evidently the case that the
background evidence problem for the Bayesian analysis of traditional
arguments by analogy a` la Hesse, is not longer relevant for analogue
experiments. Analogue experiments unlike analogical reasoning explic-
itly involve the collection of new evidence.
Given the foregoing, our analysis of the epistemology of analogue
experimentation will draw upon the literature on the philosophy of
experiment rather than analogical reasoning. In particular we will fo-
cus upon the idea of ‘external validation’ of an experiment as a pre-
condition for confirmatory power of an experiment to stretch beyond
the systems directly manipulated. Following Winsberg (2010) we can
3Hesse (1963), does in fact, rather presciently, consider the relevance of simulators
in her account of models and analogies in science. Tantalisingly, she says that analogue
machines (i.e. simulators): ‘are useful and necessary as predictive models precisely in
those cases where the material substance of parts of the analogue is not essential to
the model, but where the mutual relations of the parts are essential’ (p. 102) This
connection is unfortunately not taken up in the 1974 Bayesian analysis.
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make an important distinction between two different types of valida-
tion in the context of experimental science: i) An experimental result is
internally valid when the experimenter is genuinely learning about the
actual system they are manipulating – when, that is, the system is not
being unduly disturbed by outside interferences; ii) An experimental
result is externally valid when the information learned about the system
being manipulated is relevantly probative about the class of systems
that are of interest to the experimenters.
A nice illustration of this distinction is provided by experiments de-
signed to learn about the thermal conductivity of the iron in Earth’s
core (Konoˆpkova´ et al. 2016; Dobson 2016). The experiments were car-
ried out in the lab using samples of iron that are placed in a laser-heated
diamond-anvil cell. The pressure and temperature that the iron sam-
ples were subjected to were specifically matched to those relevant to the
cores of Mercury-sized to Earth-sized planets. For these experiments to
be internally valid the experimenters must be genuinely learning about
the samples of iron that they are manipulating. That is, the measure-
ments of thermal conductivity must correspond to the relevant prop-
erty of the actual iron samples in the lab. For the experiments to be
externally valid, these measurements must be ‘relevantly probative’ of
the thermal conductivity of iron in the core’s of Mercury-sized to Earth-
sized planets. That is, there must be a basis to generalise from the (inter-
nally valid) observations regarding the lab based system (the ‘source’),
to relevant systems outside the lab (the ‘target’).
Clearly, an experiment that is not internally valid is of little or no
epistemic value. If the experiment does not, in fact, allow us to make
reliable inferences about the source system being manipulated, for ex-
ample due to experimental error, then it is almost entirely uninforma-
tive. Furthermore, in most cases, if an experiment is internally valid,
but not externally valid, then the results will also be of comparably lit-
tle interest. Usually it is the larger class of target systems that we are
interested in learning about. An internally valid experiment that allows
us to learn about the thermal conductivity of iron in conditions that are
not suitably aligned to those of the Earth’s core would be of little use to
geophysics. The epistemic power of experiments is usually predicated
upon the combination of both internal and external validation.
The particular inferential importance of external validation can be
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illustrated via reference to the Bayesian theory of confirmation: Call E
that the proposition that the source system (i.e., the iron in the lab)
has some value of thermal conductivity corresponding to the measured
value. Given that E is true the experiment is internally valid and suc-
cessful. Call H the proposition that this value of thermal conductivity
is generalisable to a given class of target systems including the iron in
the Earth’s core (but excluding the source system). If and only if the
experiment is externally valid do we have confirmation of H by E, that
is P(H|E) > P(H). Only externally validated experiments have any real
inferential power: it is external validation that allows experiments to
confer inductive support to hypotheses regarding target systems that
we are not directly manipulating.
The key question in the epistemology of analogue experimentation is
thus whether there are arguments that can provide external validation
of the analogue experiments qua analogue experiments. By this we mean
in addition to the necessary conventional external validation, can we
provide arguments that the relevant source systems ‘stand-in’ for the
target systems to which the analogical relationship refers.
3 Hawking Radiation and Universality
Hawking radiation (Hawking 1975) is a thermal phenomena that is pre-
dicted to be generically associated with black holes. Despite the absence
of either a clear causal process behind the radiation or experimental
evidence, it is widely believed in by theoretical physicists. In fact, the
ability to recover Hawking radiation could even be taken as a theoreti-
cal test of prospective theories of quantum gravity, much like recovery
of the Bekenstein-Hawking formula for black hole entropy (Wu¨thrich
2017). There are two connected reasons why physicists are so confident
in the prediction of Hawking radiation. First, given the Unruh effect
(Unruh 1976), which associates a temperature with acceleration, Hawk-
ing radiation seems to be directly implied by the equivalence princi-
ple.4 Second, starting from Hawking’s original calculation a remarkable
number of different derivations of the effect have been given.5 The con-
4Such a conclusion is, in fact, a little too quick since the equivalence principle holds
only locally and Hawking radiation is a global effect. See (Helfer 2010).
5 See (Leonhardt and Philbin 2008; Thompson and Ford 2008; Wallace 2017).
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sensus is that the effect is ‘remarkably robust’ to the addition of compli-
cating factors to the original derivation. The overall implication is that
very general theoretical constraints coming from quantum field theory
and general relativity (two well tested theories) necessitate that some-
thing like Hawking radiation must exist. The purpose of this paper is
not to address the evidential important of such theoretical considera-
tions. Rather, our focus is on the potential for analogue experiments to
provide confirmatory evidence of a form akin to conventional experi-
ments. This notwithstanding, questions of robustness will return to the
fore in the context of a particular form of universality argument that
will be found to be central for questions of externally validation. Before
then, it will be instructive to consider the basic elements of the original
Hawking derivation of a radiative flux for astrophysical black holes in
comparison with their sonic analogues.
Hawking’s analysis is performed in the context of a semi-classical
approach to gravity. That is, we consider matter as described by quan-
tum field theory and spacetime as described by a continuous classical
geometry. Crucially, although the spacetime in question can have non-
trivial curvature, it is not coupled to the quantum field. That is, there
can be no ‘back-reaction’ between the quantum matter and classical ge-
ometry. For this modelling framework to be valid it is assumed that
we are considering quanta of wavelengths much larger than the Planck
length. Quanta of the order of the Planck length could be expected
to ‘see’ the (presumed) non-classical and non-continuous structure of
spacetime and would necessitate a quantum theory of gravity in their
description. Quite general formal considerations can be used to show
that in the semi-classical framework the vacuum state of a quantum
scalar field defined at past null infinity need not appear as a vacuum
state to observers at positive null infinity. In particular, it may contain
a ‘particle flux’. What Hawking shows in his original paper is that for
spacetime in which an astrophysical black hole forms there will be a
particle flux which observers at positive null infinity will associated
with the blackhole horizon. The asymptotic form of the expression for
the particles flux is shown to depend only upon the surface gravity of the
black hole denoted by κG. Surface gravity is essentially the force per unit
mass that must be applied at infinity in order to hold a stationary zero
angular momentum particle just outside the horizon (Jacobson 1996).
8
Hawking’s calculation implies that a black hole has intrinsic properties
that are connected to a non-zero thermal particle flux at late times. The
precise relation takes the form:




h¯ κG − 1
TBH = h¯ κG/2pi. (1)
One key feature of the derivation of the temperature is worth noting
here since it will be very important in what follows. In the derivation
of Hawking radiation an exponential gravitational red-shift means that
the black hole radiation detected at late times must be taken to cor-
respond to extremely high frequency radiation at the horizon. These
‘trans-Planckian’ modes are of wavelengths that are of precisely the
kind that we presumed to exclude in using the semi-classical frame-
work. There is thus a tension between the initial modelling assumptions
and the details of the calculation. We will return to this issue shortly.
Not long after the derivation Hawking’s radiation, it was proposed
by Unurh that a similar thermal effect might be exist in the context of
sound in fluid systems (Unruh 1981). In particular, Unruh showed that
the key elements of Hawking’s calculation could be re-applied in the
context of a semi-classical model of sound in fluids. The role of the
spacetime geometry is now played by a ‘bulk’ fluid flow as described
by continuum hydrodynamics. The role of the quantum field is then
played by a quantized linear fluctuation within the fluid, a phonon.
The modelling framework of continuum hydrodynamics is only valid
provided fluid density fluctuations of the order of molecular lengths
can be ignored. So for this semi-classical description to be adequate the
wavelengths of the phonons must be much larger than the intermolec-
ular distances. Unruh’s brilliant insight was to recognise that there is a
special class of analogue fluid systems for which the equations of semi-
classical continuum hydrodynamics take a form isomorphic to those of
semi-classical gravity. The role of the black hole event horizon is now
played by an effective acoustic horizon where the inward flowing mag-
nitude of the radial velocity of the fluid exceeds the speed of sound. The
black hole is replaced by a dumb hole. Just as in the gravitational Hawk-
ing effect a black hole event horizon is associated with a late time thermal
photonic flux, in the hydrodynamic Hawking effect Unurh showed that
a dumb hole sonic horizon can be associated with a late time thermal
9
phononic flux.
In practice, detection of Hawking radiation in a fluid is extremely
difficult and it has not been possible to construct an acoustic analogue
black hole of the type originally proposed by Unruh. Rather, an alterna-
tive medium for experimentally realisable acoustic blackholes was pro-
posed in terms of Bose-Einstein condensates (Garay et al. 2000). This
is an exotic form of matter predicted by in the 1920s (Einstein 1924;
Bose 1924) but not created experimentally until 1995 (Anderson et al.
1995). Crucially, in the limit of weak coupling and no backreaction density
fluctuations in a BEC are described by the Gross-Pitaevskii equation.
When variations in the density of the BEC occur on length scales much
greater than the healing length the Gross-Pitaevskii equation can be used
to derived an equation of the same form as that of for an irrotational
fluid derived by continuum hydrodynamics. Following the same line of
reasoning as Unruh’s original ideal fluid argument, (Garay et al. 2000)
derived a BEC Hawking Effect using appeal to this hydrodynamic ap-
proximation to a BEC.
There are now a huge number of potential analogue realisations of
the Hawking effect: phonons in superfluid liquid helium, ‘slow light’
in moving media, traveling refractive index interfaces in nonlinear op-
tical media, laser pulses in nonlinear dielectric medium.6 To realize the
Hawking effect it seems it is sufficient to have: i) a classical (effective)
background with quantum fields living on it; and ii) an (effective) ge-
ometry with an (effective) causal horizon.
A crucial feature in the derivation of all these effects is the inte-
gration over extremely high energy ‘trans-Planckian’ modes. As noted
above, in the black hole case these modes get included in the calcula-
tion due to an exponential redshift between the horizon (where they
originate) and late times (where they are detected). Such a feature is
generic to all models of Hawking radiation in which the modes orig-
inate near the horizon.7 Since the ‘trans-Planckian’ regime beyond the
domain of applicability of the semi-classical modelling framework we
are using, this problem of exponential redshift seems rather worrying.
6See (Philbin et al. 2008; Belgiorno et al. 2010; Unruh and Schu¨tzhold 2012; Liberati
et al. 2012; Nguyen et al. 2015).
7It is worth noting here that whilst, the non-standard derivation of (Giddings 2016)
does appear to allow one to avoid this feature, that of (Polchinski 1995), prima facie,
does not (Harlow 2016, pp. 37-8).
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In fact, according to some, the trans-Planckian problem is so serious
as to cast doubt upon the Hawking calculation entirely. Unruh, for in-
stance, even asks that ‘if the derivation relies on such absurd physical
assumptions, can the result be trusted?’ (Unruh 2014, p. 534). The prob-
lem with ‘trans-Planckian’ modes has a direct analogue in both the con-
tinuum hydrodynamic and BEC derivations. In particular, the acoustic
analogue of the gravitational redshift, means that in both cases we are
including in our calculation phonons of wavelengths small enough to
probe the regimes well beyond the inter-molecular length and healing
length respectively.
Fortunately, there are good reasons to expect that the Hawking effect
in both gravitational and analogue cases will be robust to disturbance
from trans-Planckian modes. In particular, (Unruh and Schu¨tzhold
2005) have provided strong theoretical reasons to expect that, under
certain conditions, any possible modifications to the Hawking flux by
trans-Planckian modes will be negligible.8 Unruh and Schu¨tzhold show
that a wide family of trans-Planckian effects can be factored into the
calculation of Hawking radiation via a non-trivial dispersion relation.
To lowest order and given certain modelling assumptions, Hawking ra-
diation, both astrophysical and acoustic, is independent of the details
of the underlying physics.
Following the influential account of (Batterman 2000), we can iso-
late two characteristic features of a universality argument: i) Details of
microstructure of a given token system are largely irrelevant for describ-
ing behaviour generically exhibited by members of the system type; and
ii) Many different system types, with physically distinct microstructure
(e.g. fluids and magnets), exhibit the same behaviour. Given this def-
inition, we can plausibly take the work of Unruh and Schu¨tzhold to
serve as a model for any theoretical argument towards the universality
of the Hawking effect in the sense that it gives conditions under which:
i) Details of ‘trans-Planckian’ structure of a given (analogue) black hole
system are largely irrelevant for describing the associated thermal be-
haviour; and ii) Many different realisations of the (analogue) black hole
system, with distinct ‘trans-Planckian’ structure (e.g. black holes and
8For further work on these issues, using a range of different methodologies, see for
example (Corley 1998; Himemoto and Tanaka 2000; Barcelo´, Garay, and Jannes 2009;
Coutant, Parentani, and Finazzi 2012). For philosophical discussion see (Dardashti,
The´bault, and Winsberg 2017) and (Gryb, Palacios, and The´bault 2018).
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BECs), exhibit the Hawking effect. We thus have a precise sense of what
it would mean for the Hawking effect to be universal, and one reason-
able theoretical basis to expect it to be so. Whilst detailed analysis of the
universality argument of Unruh and Schu¨tzhold, is an important task,
we will not further pursue it here. Rather, in the reminder of this paper,
we will assume that universality arguments for Hawking radiation are
at least plausible, and pursue the consequences for the epistemology of
analogue experimentation.
4 Validating The Steinhauer Experiments
As noted at the end of Section §2, the key question in the epistemol-
ogy of analogue experimentation is whether there are arguments that can
provide external validation of the analogue experiments qua analogue
experiments. What we mean by this is whether we can we provide ar-
guments that the relevant source systems ‘stand-in’ for the target sys-
tems to which the analogical relationship refers. External validation in
the context of a conventional experiment justifies us making inferences
about target systems, like the iron in the core of the earth, based upon
source systems, like an iron sample in a laser-heated diamond-anvil cell.
External validation of an analogue experiment would justify a similar
inferential leap from a source system, like a BEC analogue black hole,
to a target system, like an astrophysical blackhole. Clearly, in order for
such an external validation of the analogue experiments qua analogue
experiment to be valuable, the experiment would need to also be inter-
nally validated and externally validated in the conventional sense. In
this section we will briefly consider the sense in which the landmark
experiments of Steinhauer (Steinhauer 2016) in all three senses. Our ac-
count mostly follows that of (The´bault 2016).
Steinhauer used a BEC of 87Rb atoms confined radially by a nar-
row laser beam. The horizon was created by a very sharp potential step
which is swept along the BEC at a constant speed. Significantly the
length scales are such that the hydrodynamic description of a BEC is
appropriate so long as we take into account small corrections due to the
quantum potential. That is, the width of the horizon is of the order of
a few times bigger than the healing length. The main experimental re-
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sult consists of an aggregate correlation function computed based upon
an ensemble of 4,600 repeated experiments which were conducted over
six days. Given some reasonable assumptions (for example modes at
different frequency are assumed to be independent of each other) the
experiments can be interpreted as establishing an ‘entanglement wit-
ness’ to Hawking radiation in a BEC.
Internal Validation: Was Steinhauer genuinely learning about the
physics of the particular sonic horizon within the particular 87Rb
BEC that he was manipulating? Various sources of internal vali-
dation are apparent from the description of the experimental set
up given, not least the repetition of the experimental procedure
nearly five thousand times.
External Validation (Conventional): Can the particular sonic horizon
that was constructed, within the particular 87Rb BEC, stand in for
a wider class of systems? For example, all BEC sonic horizons.
Given this set of systems obeys the ‘reasonable assumptions’ of
the Steinhauer experiments, such as modes at different frequency
are assumed to be independent of each other, then we can also
externally validate the experiments in the conventional sense.
External Validation (Analogue): If accepted, the theoretical universal-
ity arguments of Unruh and Schu¨tzhold would function as exter-
nal validation for the Steinhauer experiments. That is, they give
us a theoretical basis to take the source system of the Steinhauer ex-
periments to stand in for a wider class of target systems, including
astrophysical black holes.
Our central hypothesis is that given such tripple validation, the Stein-
hauer experiments can confer inductive support to hypotheses Hawking
radiation in astrophysical black holes. The remaining task for this pa-
per is to show how important qualitative and quantitate features of this




5.1 Single Source Confirmation
The key claim that we wish to investigate is the sense in which analogue
‘dumb hole’ experiments can provide inductive support for a hypothe-
sis regarding black holes given we believe the appropriate universality
arguments. In what follows we give a Bayesian network representation
of the proposed inferential structure of analogue simulation defended
in (Dardashti et al. 2017) and show that the evidence in the source sys-
tem can provide confirmation of hypotheses regarding the target system
in certain circumstances.9
Let us start with the representation of the target system T . We de-
note by M a propositional variable that takes the two values:
M : The modelling framework M provides an empirically adequate
description of the target system T within a certain domain of con-
ditions DM.
¬M : The modelling frameworkM does not provide an empirically ad-
equate description of the target system T within a certain domain
of conditions DM.
The adequacy of the modelling framework T depends on whether the
background assumptions which justify the empirical adequacy of the
modelling framework obtain. We denote with XM the random variable
with the values:
XM : The background assumptions xM = {x1M, x2M, ..., xnM} are satisfied
for system T .
¬XM : The background assumptions xM = {x1M, x2M, ..., xnM} are not sat-
isfied for system T .
The role of the background assumptions is to define and justify the
domain of conditions for the model. These assumptions involve knowl-
edge, both theoretical and empirical, that goes beyond what is encoded
9For models of confirmation in terms of the Bayesian framework see (Hartmann
and Sprenger 2010; Bovens and Hartmann 2004) or for the hypothetic-deductive
framework see (Betz 2013). Throughout this paper, we follow the convention that
propositional variables are printed in italic script, and that the instantiations of these
variables are printed in roman script.
14
within the model. Such knowledge need not be in the form of a simple,
unified framework. Rather the background knowledge of the people
who build and use models can contain an incompletely integrated set
of explicit and tacit ideas about when a particular modelling framework
will be adequate for a particular purpose and to a particular desired de-
gree of accuracy.
With this in mind, we can introduce the random variables A and XA
for the source system S . Where A is a propositional variable that takes
the two values:
A : The modelling framework A provides an empirically adequate de-
scription of the source system S within a certain domain of con-
ditions DS .
¬A : The modelling framework A does not provide an empirically ade-
quate description of the source system S within a certain domain
of conditions DA.
and XA is the random variable with the values:
XA : The background assumptions xA = {x1A, x2A, ..., xkA} are satisfied
for system S .
¬XA : The background assumptions xA = {x1A, x2A, ..., xkA} are not satis-
fied for system S .
The systems T and S are assumed to differ in terms of their material
constituency and the fundamental laws governing their dynamics. This
means that the background assumptions behind the models M and A
can reasonably be assumed to be very different. Given this, it is justified,
prima facie, to assume that XM and XA are probabilistically indepen-
dent. Furthermore, we have assumed that the source system is empiri-
cally accessible meaning we can gain empirical evidence regarding (at
least) some of its consequences. We can encode this by introducing a
variable E corresponding to the two values, E, the empirical evidence
obtains, and ¬E, the empirical evidence does not obtain.
We can represent all the variables introduced thus far as well as
the probabilistic dependancies using a Bayesian network (Bovens and
Hartmann 2004). The random variables are represented as ‘nodes’ in





Figure 1: One source system without external validation.
edges (i.e. arrows). We draw an arrow between two nodes when the
variable in the ‘parent node’ has a direct influence on the variable in the
‘child node’. Probabilistic independence is represented implicit by the
absence of an arrow between two nodes. The entire set up thus far is
represented by the Bayesian network in Figure 1.
Before we continue, let us first translate the discussion from before
about external validation into the Bayesian framework. As mentioned
before the equations of the target model are syntactically isomorphic to
the equations that are suppose to govern the behaviour of the source
model. This is so, even though one arrives at them from different start-
ing points (semi-classical gravity vs. e.g. semi-classical continuum hy-
drodynamics) and by making different background assumptions. The
question of externally validating the model (both conventional and
analogue) translates into the question of the domain of applicability
of the model. That is, whether the mathematical model is an empiri-
cally adequate description of one specific BEC horizon10 (the one ex-
perimented upon), all BEC horizons, or even including the black hole
horizon. Whether this is the case or not is therefore not determined by
the mathematical equations, as they are the same, but by the ability of
the experiment to probe the respective background assumptions.
Let us first consider the external validation in the ‘conventional’
sense, i.e. in this context the question whether the experiment on 87Rb
BEC, can stand in for a wider class of systems, namely all BEC sonic
horizons. This will allow us to clarify the difference between the two
kinds of external validation. By deriving the relevant equations, the
10This is always taken to be within the realm of validity of the hydrodynamic ap-
proximation.
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background assumptions were not dependent on the specifics of the
BEC used.11 So the majority of the background assumptions xA of the
specific 87Rb BEC experiment will be shared with any experiment on
non-87Rb condensates. Some background assumptions may, of course,
still differ as they may be effects of some specific BEC that is not shared
by others that may influence the adequacy of the derivational assump-
tions. However, this will still keep a majority of shared background
assumptions, which in the Bayesian network will now function as a
common cause for the adequacy of the model for 87Rb BEC and the
other non-87Rb BECs. External validation in the ‘conventional’ sense
then amounts to probing, through investigation (e.g. robustness anal-
ysis), the background assumptions which are not shared by all BECs.
However, even in the absence of this further investigation, we can al-
ready assume that (under certain assumptions) the observation on the
87Rb BEC will confirm the claim with respect to the larger class of BECs.
This is due to the known shared background assumptions. So in the
case of ‘conventional’ external validation we can observe a probabilistic
dependence even in the absence of external validation.
Let us contrast this now with the case of external validation in the
analogue sense. The assumption that XA and XM in Fig. 1 are prob-
abilistically independent is equivalent to us having reasons to believe
that the target model and the source model share no background as-
sumptions. This is a legitimate assumption as these models originate,
unlike the case of ‘conventional’ validation, from different theories.
The universality argument now functions as an inferential link be-
tween certain background assumptions of both the model of the source
system and the model of the target system. That is, while we expect
the majority of the background assumptions to remain independent
the universality argument provides a link between some background
assumptions. In this sense evidence in A may support a subset of the
background assumptions XM. The inductive support that such an exter-
nally validated experiment would provide for M will depend on how
certain we are about the adequacy of the related background assump-
tions. If we have already independent grounds on which to assign high
probabilities to x1A or x
2
M, then there is not much added in terms of
inductive support we gain. In the context of simulating Hawking ra-
11See Faccio (2013) for an elementary derivation of the result.
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diation via ‘dumb holes’, the universality argument provides the link
between the background assumptions, which is here the independence
of the phenomenon in each system from the respective influences of the
higher energy theories. The independence claim, however, is probably
the least supported of the background assumption and is thus the route
via which analogue simulation can provide strong inductive support
for black hole Hawking radiation. So unlike the case of ‘conventional’
external validation, we will not be able to observe a probabilistic depen-
dence between the two systems without externally validating it first.
Before we turn to the details of the Bayesian analysis we can already
observe several features of our approach. First, the question of exter-
nal validation (in the ‘conventional’ and analogue sense) translates into
a question of probing the respective background assumptions. Second,
whether we have external validation of the analogue kind is not neces-
sarily related to the question whether we have external validation of the
‘conventional’ kind. The reason for this is that the background assump-
tions that are being probed by the latter kind of validation need not be
the relevant background assumptions. And finally, it is a consequence
of the Bayesian account that both kind of validations come in degrees.
Let us now turn to the details of the Bayesian analysis. In order to
make explicit calculation tractable we will subsume both the univer-
sality arguments and the common background assumptions within a
single variable X. The binary value X has the values:
X : universality arguments in support of common background assump-
tions hold.
¬X : universality arguments in support of common background as-
sumptions do not hold.
So X expresses a rather general claim, which can plausibly be assumed
to be uncertain. If we were certain about X, the inference from A to
M would be blocked. We will say more about this later. We will also
subsume the remaining background assumptions, that is those that are
not addressed by X, under the nodes M and A.
Under the conditions of our assumptions, the simplified Bayesian
network given in Figure 2 will then adequately model the chain of infer-
ences involved in analogue simulation supported by universality argu-




Figure 2: Simplified network for one source system with universality
arguments.
ory of confirmation. This requires that one proves that P(M|E) > P(M).
For this purpose we need to specify all prior probabilities of the ‘parent
node’ in the Bayesian network (i.e., X) and the conditional probabilities
for the other ‘child nodes’, given the values of their parents.
Let us simplify our notation by using the following shorthand:
P(X) =: x P(M|X) =: mx
P(A|X) =: ax P(E|A) =: ea.
The probabilities of the corresponding negated propositions are de-
noted with a bar, viz. P(A|X¯) =: ax¯, P(A¯|X) =: a¯x and P(A¯|X¯) =: a¯x¯.
The first central assumption is that the prior probability of X lies in
the open interval (0,1), however, as we discussed in Sect. 3, we have the-
oretical arguments, in particular the result by Unruh and Schu¨tzhold,
in favor of X. So a rational agent would assign:
1
2
< x < 1. (2)
The conditional probabilities are then constrained by the following con-
ditions:
mx > mx¯ (3)
ax > ax¯ (4)
ea > ea¯. (5)
The conditions (2) to (4) encode probabilistically the relevant elements
of the universality arguments since they allow for the possibility of a
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background assumption that supports both M and A. The statement (5)
encodes probabilistically that the empirical evidence actually plays the
role of evidence in favour of the model A.
With this, the following theorem holds (the proof is in Appendix A):
Theorem 1: P(M|E) > P(M), if the conditions (2), (3), (4) and
(5) are satisfied.
The satisfaction of Theorem 1 implies that E confirms M within a
Bayesian analysis of confirmation. Within the framework of analogue
simulation, provided we have universality arguments with prior proba-
bility that is neither unity or zero, confirmation of a hypothesis regard-
ing the target system can obtain based upon evidence relating to the
source system. It is important to note again, that having independent
grounds on which to support one of the common background assump-
tions will ‘block’ the inductive support E can give for M as that back-
ground assumption already has a large marginal probability. This does
not pose a problem for this account but offers a way to distinguish be-
tween those circumstances in which the novel empirical evidence E can
provide substantial inductive support for M and those circumstances it
cannot be used for that purpose.
An important implication of the Bayesian analysis relates to the role
of the syntactic isomorphism. The structure of the Bayesian network is
such that the syntactic isomorphism is not explicitly represented. Fur-
thermore, based upon the network, even if no syntactic isomorphism
obtains between the modelling frameworksM and A, one could sensi-
bly talk about confirmation of M by E, provided there exists some non-
empty set of shared background assumptions. The key point is that in
such circumstances although confirmation of M would indeed obtain,
there would be no ‘analogue simulation’. As discussed above, the role
of the isomorphism is to guarantee that there will be a term within the
modelling language ofM that is counterpart to the term within A that
refers to E . Without such a term within M there would be no sense in
which S is acting as a simulator for the behaviour of T . For analogue
simulation with confirmation to obtain we require both universality ar-
guments and a syntactic isomorphism.
To recapitulate, in this section we have demonstrated that confirma-
tion via analogue simulation obtains within a Bayesian analysis pro-
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vided there exists an inferential connection between the conditions of
applicability of the target and system models. That is, if there exists a
binary variable that is assumed to be positively correlated with the em-
pirical adequacy of both the source and target models, then evidence
in favour of the model of the source system can be used to make infer-
ences about the target system. This, in-and-of-itself, is not a particularly
surprising result, and certainly the demonstration of such in principle
inferential relations is not an external validation of the framework for
analogue simulation that is being proposed. Rather, we take the results
of this section to: i) demonstrate the internal consistency of the informal
arguments towards confirmation via analogue simulation given in (Dar-
dashti et al. 2017); and ii) provide a powerful evaluative and heuristic
tool for the analysis of analogue simulation as it exists within contem-
porary scientific practice. Two natural directions of further development
are: i) the identification and evaluation of potential cases of confirma-
tion via analogue simulation based upon different forms of analogue
external validation in other scientific examples; and ii) the refinement
of the Bayesian model to include cases within more than one analogue
system. The second of these will be pursued in the following section.
5.2 Multiple Source Confirmation
One important application of analogue simulation is in the context of
universality arguments. In such cases the source system is ‘multiply re-
alisable’ in that there are various different physical systems that can be
used to implement the analogue simulation. Such a notion of ‘multi-
ply realisability’ is intended to be something more than the variation
of the material constitution of the source system. Such variation would
involve keeping fixed the ‘nomological behaviour’ of the source system
but changing the material constitution. Rather, the situation we are con-
sidering is when one varies the modelling frameworks used to construct
the analogy, and in doing so considers equations that are syntactically
isomorphic but extensionally distinct.
For example, consider again the dumb hole case. Rather than making
use of the syntactic isomorphism between BEC and gravitational models
we can draw inferences based upon analogue black holes constructed










Figure 3: n-source system.
‘slow light’ in moving media (Carusotto et al. 2008). This is to vary both
the material constitution and the nomological behaviour of the analogue
system.
With such examples in mind, we can extend the analysis of the
previous section to consider the case when we have multiple sources
each providing independent evidence for the target system modelling
framework. The expectation would be that adding more source sys-
tems should increase the degree of confirmation, but that this increase
will eventually reach some ‘saturation point’. This matches the intuition
that, given some non-zero (or one) prior probability for the truth of the
universality arguments, a small set of different successful realisations
of the source system would be enough to provide strong evidence in
favour of a hypotheses of regarding analogue behaviour in the target
system.
Consider a Bayesian network for an n-source system (Figure 3). The
question we would like to answer is how does the confirmation mea-
sure change as one increases the number of different analogue systems
providing us with evidence. Following the same line of reasoning as the
last section we assume:
a′x > a′¯x , e′a′ > e
′
a¯′ . (6)












We can now calculate the difference measure of confirmation, which is
defined as
∆(n) := P(M|E, E′, ..., E(n))− P(M) (9)
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and obtain ∆(n) > 0 (see Appendix B).
It can further be shown that:
Theorem 2: ∆(n) is a strictly increasing function of the num-
ber of source systems.
This theorem implies that as the number of different analogue sys-
tems providing evidence increases so does the degree of confirmation.12
Again, this is not a particularly surprising result. Given that confirma-
tion via analogue simulation obtains for a single source system, one
would expect that adding in more and more (independent) source sys-
tems would allow one to increase the degree of confirmation. The fea-
ture that is most interesting is not the fact that ∆(n) is strictly increasing,
but rather the functional form of this increase. In particular, the natural
intuition is that as the number of source systems increases the increase
in the degree of confirmation would eventually saturate. One of the
chief virtues of the Bayesian model for analogue simulation with mul-
tiple source systems is that it allows us to give an analytical expression
for such a saturation point.
First, let us consider how ∆(n) changes in the large n limit. A little
analytical work (again see Appendix B) allows us to show that:
lim
n→+∞∆
(n) → x¯(mx −mx¯) = Nsat.. (10)
This means that the maximum amount of confirmation one can obtain
by adding in more and more sources is bounded by some finite num-
ber, Nsat., determined by the prior probabilities x¯, mx and mx¯. Beyond
this point, there is vanishingly small added value (in terms of confirma-
tion) achieved by adding in more source systems. Two features of Nsat.
are worth remarking on. First, the higher the prior probability of X the
lower the saturation point will be. This makes sense because the more
sure we are of X to start with, the lower the limit on the extra infor-
mation we can learn from E, E′, . . . , E(n). Second, the higher the relative
likelihood of M given X to M given ¬X (i.e. mx − mx¯), the higher the
saturation point. This makes sense because the stronger the relationship
between X and M the more we can potentially learn from E, E′, . . . , E(n).
12Theorem 2 does not depend on the choice of this particular confirmation measure
and will also hold if we move to another confirmation measure (Fitelson 1999).
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Figure 4: Confirmation measure dependence and saturation point.
A further interesting feature that we can examine is the speed with
which the saturation point is approached. We can examine this ‘rate of
saturation’ by plotting ∆(n) for a set of prior probabilities of X.13 As
can be seen from Figure 4, the higher the prior probability of X, the
quicker the saturation point is reached. Strikingly, for the values of the
parameters considered, we find that given a prior of greater than 0.5 for
X, saturation can be reached after only three or four successful analogue
experiments.
This result is in tune with scientific intuitions regarding analogue
simulation in the context of universality arguments. Consider, in par-
ticular the dumb hole Hawking radiation case. There has been, thus
far, only one implementation of a source system that is reported to dis-
play the quantum Hawking effect: the Bose-Einstein condensate experi-
ments of (Steinhauer 2016).14 Given initial confidence in the universality
arguments, if another different implementation of a source system dis-
13See Equation (23) of Appendix B. Here we have assumed for simplicity that γ(k) =
c for all k with c > 1. c measures both the likelihood of A(k) given X and the likelihood
of E(k) given A(k). The stronger the dependence of these the stronger the exponential
increase of ∆(n) with n.
14We should note that the earlier experiments of (Weinfurtner et al. 2013) show
classical aspects of Hawking radiation in an analogue system using surface waves.
Modelling the inferential relationship between the classical and quantum experiments
is an interesting open question.
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playing the Hawking effect was achieved, that should surely radically
increase the belief in the astrophysical Hawking effect. However, once
a few such examples were constructed, one would quickly stop gaining
new insight. Conversely, given initial skepticism regarding the univer-
sality arguments, a second implementation of the dumb hole source sys-
tem would not radically increase the belief in the astrophysical Hawk-
ing effect. Furthermore, in such circumstances it would only be after a
diverse and extensive range of implementations of source systems that
one would stop believing that new examples gave new information.
5.3 Confirmation Dependence on Source System
Although most of the proposed analogue models of black hole Hawking
radiation have not been tested yet, there can be significant differences
in our prior belief regarding the adequacy of these models. One reason
for this is that the modelling may rely on a strong theoretical basis in
one system but a rather conjectural basis in the other. Another reason
is that one may have good control of the experimental setup, such that
one has more reason to rely on the adequate realization of the various
idealizing assumptions involved in the derivation of the model. This
will have as an effect that we would assign different marginal probabili-
ties to the analogue models. A question thus arises, namely how do the
variations in the marginal probabilities one assigns to the adequacy of
the analogue model affect the confirmation behaviour of the analogue
setup.
For simplicity, we will only consider the variation for the one-source
model (Fig. 2). One can now show (see App. C for details):
Theorem 3: ∂∆∂a < 0, if conditions (2) to (5) hold,
where the derivative is with respect to a := P(A).
This plausible result implies that an assignment of a higher prob-
ability to the adequacy of the analogue model will have the effect of
a decrease in the confirmation of the adequacy of the target model by
the observation of the analogue Hawking effect. Or to put it differently:
the more certain we are about the adequacy of the model we are ex-
perimenting on, the less effective is the evidence obtained there. Signif-
icantly, this result has direct implications for the respective epistemic
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value of future analogue experiments. In particular, all else being equal,
it implies that scientists will learn more by conducting future analogue
experiments using media about which we are less certain regarding the
fundamental physics, than those using media about which we are more
confident.
6 Conclusion and Prospectus
History is replete with examples of ‘transformative’ technology having
a profound and lasting impact on the methodological foundations of
science. Much recent literature in the philosophy of science has focused
on the sense in which computer simulation should (or should not) be
taken to have had such an impact.15 Analogue simulation is a new in-
ferential tool found at the cutting edge of modern science that we see
good reasons to take as potentially transformative. Building upon the
initial analysis of (Dardashti et al. 2017), in this paper we have applied a
Bayesian analysis to explicate the structure of inferences that analogue
simulation can and cannot allow us to make.
Our three principal results are: i) that ‘single source’ confirmation
via analogue simulation can obtain under certain conditions; ii) that
‘multiple source’ confirmation via analogue simulation displays the
generic feature of saturation in confirmatory power; iii) analogue exper-
iments in which we are more confident about the fundamental physics
provide less confirmation than those about which we are more confi-
dent. Our results provide a basis to both formalise the epistemic value
of analogue experiments that have been conducted and to advise scien-
tists as to the respective epistemic value of future analogue experiments.
A Proof of Theorem 1
Let us start with the Bayesian network depicted in Figure 1. We have to
show that
P(M|E) = P(M, E)
P(E)
> P(M). (11)
15See for example (Frigg and Reiss 2009; Parker 2009; Winsberg 2010; Beisbart and
Norton 2012).
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The joint probability can be obtained in the following way16:
P(M, E) = ∑
X,A




= x mx (axea + a¯x ea¯) + x¯mx¯(ax¯ ea + a¯x¯ ea¯)
= x mx α+ x¯ mx¯ β (12)
where we have defined
α := ax ea + a¯x ea¯ (13)




P(X, M, A, E)
= x α+ x¯ β (15)
and
P(M) = xmx + x¯mx¯. (16)
Defining the difference measure ∆ := P(M|E)− P(M), we need to
show that ∆ is larger than zero. After some algebraic manipulation one
obtains
∆ =
x mx α+ x¯ mx¯ β− (x mx + x¯ mx¯)(x α+ x¯ β)
x α+ x¯ β
=
x¯ x (mx −mx¯)(α− β)
x α+ x¯ β
. (17)
It is easy to show that
α− β = (ax − ax¯)(ea − ea¯), (18)
so it follows that
∆ =
x¯ x (mx −mx¯)(ax − ax¯)(ea − ea¯)
x α+ x¯ β
. (19)
16See (Bovens and Hartmann 2004, Sect. 3.5) on the general methodology of reading






Figure 5: 2-source system.
So if (3), (4) and (5) are satisfied it follows that ∆ > 0, which needed to
be shown.
B Proofs for n Source Systems
To see how the previous theorem can be generalized to the n source
systems represented in Figure 3 let us consider first the 2-source system
represented in Figure 5.
We need to show that P(M|E, E′) = P(M, E, E′)/P(E, E′) > P(M).
Let us start with the following joint probability
P(M, E, E′) = ∑
X,A,A′




= x mx α α′ + x¯ mx¯ β β′ (20)
where α′ and β′ is defined identically to (13) and (14) with e and a
replaced with e′ and a′.
Similarly we obtain
P(E, E′) = ∑
X,A,A′
P(X)P(E|A)P(A|X)P(E′|A′)P(A′|X)
= x α α′ + x¯ β β′. (21)
Defining as before ∆′ := P(M|E, E′)− P(M) it follows that
∆′ = xx¯(mx −mx¯)(α α
′ − β β′)
x α α′ + x¯ β β′
. (22)
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Now α α′ − β β′ is larger than zero iff (α β)/(α′ β′) > 1. This in turn is
the case when α− β > 0 and α′ − β′ > 0. Both of these conditions are
satisfied due to (4) to (6).
So it follows that (22) is larger than zero.
It is now straightforward to generalize to the n-source system rep-
resented in Figure 3. For the n-source system we need to show that
∆(n) = P(M|E, E′, ..., E(n)) − P(M) > 0. It follows from the above con-
sideration that
∆(n) =
x x¯(mx −mx¯)(∏nk=0 α(k) −∏nk=0 β(k))





with α(0) = α and β(0) = β. We have again ∆(n) > 0 once (4) to (8) are
satisfied.
Let us define γ(n) := ∏nk=0 α
(k)/β(k). Since α(k) > β(k) for all k, γ(n)




x x¯ (mx −mx¯)
(x γ(n) + x¯)2
> 0. (24)
So as n increases, i.e. as the number of analogue systems providing
evidence increases, so does the amount of confirmation. Setting κ :=










C Proof of Theorem 3
We need to show how the confirmation measure (19) varies as our belief










































(x α+ x¯ β)2
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= − k xx¯
(x α+ x¯ β)2
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k (ax − ax¯)
(x α+ x¯ β)2
(
x α+ x¯ β− x (1 + x) α− x x¯ β
)
,
where we have used the shorthand k := (mx − mx¯)(ea − ea¯). Plugging





(x α+ x¯ β)2
(
x¯(1 + x¯) β− x(1 + x) α
)
. (27)
Assuming that (3) and (5) hold makes k positive and assuming (2), (4)
and (5) hold makes the large bracket in (27) negative, i.e. it leads to
∂∆/∂a < 0.
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